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RECENT CASES
sounding in tort may not be maintained between spouses. The common law.
reason for preventing such suits has been abrogated by the statutes, and the
reasoning of courts upholding the common law view seem to be lacking a sound
foundation. Where jurisdictions have already allowed the wife to sue her
husband in tort, it cannot logically be held that the husband does not have
the same right,2 1 unless the statute involved clearly denies him such right.
RICHARD A. RAILFS
INJUNCTION - ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS - TAXPAYER'S RIGHT TO EN-
JOIN PUBLIC OFFICIAL. - Plaintiff, a resident citizen taxpayer of the City of
Los Angeles, brought this action to obtain an injunction against defendant
as Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles, to enjoin him from the illegal
expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance by means of hidden
microphones. Defendant had been installing such instruments in places of
occupancy without the consent or knowledge of the property owners. The
Supreme Court of California held, two justices dissenting, that a taxpayer
can restrain a public official from expending tax money for activities which
violate federal and state constitutional provisions.1 Wirin v. Parker, 313 P.2d
844 (Cal. 1957).
The illegal expenditure of public funds can be restrained by a taxpayer
under California law. 2 A taxpayer has a right to sue, when public money
raised by taxation is being illegally spent, based upon his equitable interest
in such funds and his liability to replenish the treasury when they are mis-
appropriated. 3 This right will lie only where the funds being misappropriated
have been raised by taxation. The taxpayer has no cause of action when the
funds have been derived from the sale of municipal bonds for public im-
provements.4
In the absence of statutes some jurisdictions5 hold that unless the taxpayer
can show that he will suffer a special injury differing from that suffered by
the public at large he cannot maintain this type of an action. Other jurisdictions 6
allow the taxpayer to bring an action even though he cannot show a special
injury to himself.
The fact that the illegal expenditure may actually be a saving of tax funds
is of no consequence, nor does it make a difference if the amount of the
21. Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 308 (1877) (dictum); McKinney v. McKinney,
59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940, 949 (1943) (dictum); Waite v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202,
209 N.W. 475, 481 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
1. The court found that defendant's action is in violation of the 4th and 14th
amendments to the United States Constitution and of art.* 1, § 19 of the California
Constitution which prohibits illegal searches and seizures.
2. Cal. Code of Civil Procedures, Title 7, § 526a. An action restraining a public
officer from illegal expenditure of public funds can be maintained by a taxpayer in
North Dakota, if he can show irreparable iniuries and no adequate remedy at law.
See Viestenz v. Arthur Tp., 78 N.D. 1029, 54 N.W.2d 572 (1952).
3. Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915); Jones v. O'Connell, 266 Ill.
443, 107 N.E. 731 (1914).
4. Price v. Mattoon, 364 Ill. 512, 4 N.E.2d 850 (1936).
5. Ibid.; Walldorf v. Chattanooga, 192 Tenn. 86, 237 S.W.2d 939 (1951).
6. Terry v. Bender, 143 Cal. App.2d 198, 300 P.2d 119 (1956); Barge v. Camp,
209 Ga. 38, 70 S.E.2d 360, 364 (1952) (dictum).
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expenditure is large or small. 7 This type of an action is not an interference
with the discretionary powers of an officer when it prevents him from doing
that which which he has no legal right to do.8
Generally the individual has no remedy where evidence is obtained illegally
by police officers since illegally obtained evidence is admissible in the major-
ity of state courts.9 However, one effect of the decision in the instant case is to
provide an indirect remedy by denying law enforcemaent agencies the funds
to gather such illegal evidence. 1  WLLIAM J. MCMENAMY
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - REVIEW - TRIAL DE Novo IN DISTRICT COURT
BY VIRTUE OF APPEAL Is NOT THE EXERCISE OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. -
Defendant was found guilty in police magistrate's court of violating a city
ordinance. The District Court dismissed defendant's appeal on the grounds
that a trial de novo in the district court, as prescribed by statute, is the
exercise of original jurisdiction,l and because no other method of appellate
procedure is provided for with respect to the police magistrate's court. The
Supreme Court of North Dakota, held, that a trial anew in a district court
is not the exercise of original jurisdiction by the district court and therefore,
is not violative of the police magistrate's original jurisdiction. Minot v. Davis,
84 N.W.2d 891 (N.D. 1957).
Despite the fact that the court in the instant case stated their holding
as settled law in this state, the constitutional and statutory provisions concern-
ing an appeal from police magistrate's court appear to be in conflict. Article
1132 of the North Dakota Constitution provides that police magistrates shall
have jurisdiction of all cases arising under the ordinances of cities. The
legislature has conferred upon police magistrates exclusive jurisdiction in a11
cases arising under ordinances of cities.3 Thus, it would. appear that the
police magistrate has exclusive original jursdiction over the violation of city
ordinaces.
In regards to appeal, the constitution 4 provides that the district court
shall have original jurisdiction except as otherwise provided for in the con-
stitution, and that appeals shall lid from the county, justice of peace, and
police magistrate's court in accord with such regulations as the law will pre-
scribe. 5 The legislature in section 33-1234 of the codeo provides that appeal
may be had from a justice of the peaceor a police magistrate sitting as a
justice of the peace in criminal matters. Section 40-1819 of the code7 provides
7. See Trickey v. Long Beach, 101 Cal. App.2d 416, 226 P.2d 694 (1951); Brown
v. Boyd, 33 Cal. App.2d 416, 91 P.2d 926 (1939); Crowe v. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117,
193 Pac. 111 (1920); Osburn v. Stone, 170 Cal. 480, 150 Pac. 367 (1915).
8. Viestenz v. Arthur Tp., 78 N.D. 1029, 54 N.W.2d 572 (1952).
9. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2183 (3d ed., 1940). Technically the individual has a
right of action in tort against the law enforcement officer who obtains the evidence
illegally, however, this remedy is illusory. See Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d
690, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
10. See Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App.2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948).
1. Under § 113 of the N.D. Const. and § 40-1801 of the N.D. Rev. Code (1943) ex-
clnsive original jurisdiction over the violation of city ordinances is vested in the police
magistrate. (Emphasis added)
2. N.D. Const. art. IV, § 113.
3. N.D. Rev. Code § 40-1801 (1943).
4. N.D. Const. art. IV, § 103.
5. N.D. Const. art. IV, § 114.
6. N.D. Rev. Code § 33-1234 (1953 Supp.).
7. N.D. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 266, § 1.
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